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Imperfections in Perfection of
Ohio Fixture Liens
Sherman S. Hollander
OBJECTIVE: FIXTURE LAW UNIFORMITY
When the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in Ohio on
July 1, 1962, it was already on the statute books of eighteen states.' It
since has been approved in several others.2 Presumably, it is on its way
to achieving a condition of national uniformity. The merit of this pur-
pose as an aid to commerce is inescapable. How closely the achievement
will approach the objective, however, has yet to be determined in most
areas of the law entered by the Code.
THE AUTHOR (B.A., LL.B., Western Reserve
University) is Tide Officer of Hollander Ab-
stract Company in Cleveland, Ohio. He is a
member of the Legislative Committee of the
Cuyahoga Bar Association and a recent contri-
butor of various literature on the Uniform
Commercial Code.
One major exception is the
law of fixtures where its failure
is already evident. Even a per-
son as steeped in the Code as
Peter F. Coogan3 has com-
mented on its lack of success
in achieving simplicity, clarity
or uniformity.' Perhaps those
who drafted this monumental
legal enterprise did not appreciate the scope of the problem which fix-
tures law represents. This subject is dealt with directly in only an insig-
nificant part of the Uniform Commercial Code and obliquely in only a
few other places. But the labors of Hercules may have been less awe-
1. The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in the following eighteen states as of July
1, 1962:
State Effective
Pa. July 1, 1954; revised Jan. 1, 1960
Mass. Oct. 1, 1958; amended Dec. 13, 1959
Ky. July 1, 1960
N. H. July 1, 1961
Conn. Oct. 1, 1961
R. L Jan. 2, 1962
Ark. Jan. 1, 1962
N. M. Jan. 1, 1962
Wyo. Jan. 1, 1962
Ohio July 1, 1962
Ill. July 1, 1962
Okla. Jan. 1, 1963
N. J. Jan. 1, 1963
Alaska Jan. 1, 1963
Ga. April 1, 1963
Ore. Sept. 1, 1963
Mich. Jan. 1, 1964
N. Y. Sept. 27, 1964
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol 14:683
some than the task of bringing uniformity to this segment of law.
The law of fixtures is inseparable from the law of real property. It
is intertwined with the rights, duties, and obligations of lienholders and
of persons with rights of ownership and possession of various kinds, ca-
pacities, and degrees. It is also affected by recording and notice statutes.
Did the creators of the Uniform Commercial Code recognize the breadth
of the implications of the area they had entered so casually? Perhaps
they still do not. Apparently they relied on the theory that uniform stat-
utory phraseology creates uniform law. Fixture law is a glaring example
of the fallacy of this belief.
In Ohio, principles for determining when an item of personal prop-
erty became so affixed to the land that it should henceforth be treated
as part of it were established by early case law. The problem was re-
duced primarily to applying the rules to the state of facts at hand.' The
intrusions by the Uniform Commercial Code, however, are so inconsistent
with prior Ohio law that a chaotic condition has been created in that
which was previously dear.7 In fact, the intermixture of the new provi-
sions with prior Ohio law has made a shambles of logical analysis in
some important situations. These will be partly explored, but not solved.
Curative legislation is mandatory' to inject any degree of consistent order,
clarity, or equity into this picture. Even then, uniformity cannot be ex-
pected.
2. The following additional states have enacted the Uniform Commercial Code:
Calif. Effective Jan. 1965
Ind. Effective July 1964
Md. Effective Feb. 1964
Mont. Effective Jan. 1965
Tenn. Effective July 1964
W. Va. Effective July 1964
Legislation for adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code was pending at the time of
preparation of this article in the following additional states:
Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
3. Member of the Massachusetts Bar; Lecturer, Harvard Law School; LL.B., Western Reserve,
1939; LL.M., Harvard, 1942; member Ropes & Gray, Boston, Mass., and prolific writer of
articles on the subject of chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
4. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 1319 (1962).
5. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853). This action was "for the appraisement and sale
of certain mortgaged premises, to satisfy a claim of complainant against Hewitt, and also, to
enjoin sundry judgment creditors of Hewitt from detaching certain alleged parts of the mort-
gaged premises, and selling the same on execution as chattel property." Id. at 512. The
opinion squarely faced the issue, and has led this decision to be regarded as "the leading case
on fixtures in America." 24 OHIO JUR. 2d Fixtures § 2 (1957).
6. 24 OHIO JUR. 2d Fixtures § 2 (1957).
7. Burns, Some Specific Problems Raised by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code -n
Ohio, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 56,63 (1962).
8. Since drafting of this article the 105th General Assembly of Ohio has passed amendments
to several code sections referred to herein. The amendments referred to in the Addenda at the
end of this report become effective on Ocober 8, 1963.
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THE NEw OHIo FIXTURE LIEN LAW
The Detachable Fixture
The heart of the Uniform Commercial Code application to fixtures
appears in section 1309.32 of the Ohio Revised Code (UCC § 9-313).'
Its opening paragraph is as follows:
(A) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated
into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass,
metal work, and the like and no security interest in them exists under
sections 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised Code unless the
structure remains personal property under applicable law. The law of
this state other than Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1306.,
1307., 1308., and 1309. of the Revised Code, determines whether and
when other goods become fixtures. Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304.,
1305., 1306., 1307., 1308., and 1309. of the Revised Code do not pre-
vent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to
the law applicable to real estate.
The implication of a basic change in legal theory is apparent from
the opening sentence. Under pre-code law in Ohio, fixtures were dearly
real estate. Therefore, there was no need to differentiate building ma-
terials by separation from fixtures. The distinction is necessary when
materials incorporated into a structure are to be treated differently than
goods constructed of such materials. Thus, lumber used to erect a house
could have been the subject of a mechanics lien. But once installed in
the structure, the lumber is part and parcel of the real property, and the
lien rights to secure payment for it are for a lien on the real estate, not on
the lumber alone.
Paragraph (A) commences with an exclusion from operation of the
section. All of the listed items are building materials, although the
words "building materials" do not appear. Whether "and the like" is
sufficient to include all unlisted building materials may require extensive
litigation. The exclusion is not meant to apply to all items of property
composed of the materials listed or implied, or no fixture lien would be
possible. Under the new law, it must be determined when an item in-
stalled in a structure is a material not entitled to be the subject of a fix-
ture lien, and when it has been fabricated to a point which makes it the
subject of such a lien. Thus, though metal work is excluded, the ques-
tion arises as to whether plumbing pipes are treated differently. Would
that creation be excluded from the lien if they have been assembled into
a plumbing wall which is a functional unit? Would the result be dif-
ferent if the plumbing wall were assembled outside of the structure and
9. Ohio rejected the original uniform numbering system of the uniform act in order to em-
ploy consistent numbering with the Ohio Revised Code. Thus, UCC § 9-313(1) became
Ohio Revised Code 1309.32(A), and other sub-provisions such as divisions (2), (3), (4),
and (5) were changed to (B), (C), (D), and (E).
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then inserted, than in a situation where the construction takes place with-
in the structure? This result is possible because the materials might be
free of fixture liens only if installed as materials.
The same question exists as to heating and air conditioning ducts,
electrical conduit, precast units, and prefabricated structural items such
as windows, door frames, and a vast and growing field of different com-
ponents. So long as all such items as well as fixtures became real estate
upon incorporation into the structure of the building, no need for dif-
ferentiation arose. But the distinction made in the opening sentence of
Ohio Revised Code, section 1309.32(A) (UCC § 9-313(1)) is neces-
sitated by the different treatment fixtures will receive henceforth.1"
The second sentence of section 1309.32(A) (UCC 5 9-313(1))
employs as its definition of the word fixture, "the law of this state." Any
possibility of uniformity is shattered at this point. Obviously, the law
of Ohio cannot be uniform with Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Kentucky,
or other states in fixture law if fixture is a different word in each state.
But even more important, the application of the fixture lien is totally in-
consistent with the definition of a fixture under existing Ohio law. By
the oversimplification of the fixture definition through adoption of a
local meaning, the originators of the code have infected the new lien
with a condition of schizophrenia.
The leading case of Teaff v. Hewitt" has been simultaneously in-
corporated into the code and overruled by it. For over a century, Ohio
has recognized two basic types of tangible property - real and personal.
When a unit of personal property becomes a fixture, Ohio law has con-
sidered it real property.
A removable fixture as a term of general application, is a solecism -
a contradiction in words. There does not appear to be any necessity or
propriety in classifying movable articles, which may be for temporary
purposes somewhat attached to the land, under any general denomination
distinguishing them from other chattel property.12
A fixture is an article which was a chattel, but which by being physi-
cally annexed or affixed to the realty, became accessory to it and part
and parcel of it.'3
But the fixture referred to in the rest of section 1309.32 (UCC 5
9-313) is a new breed in Ohio. It is neither described nor defined, but the
legal characteristics it is given are totally inconsistent with prior Ohio
law. 4 It was previously inherent in Ohio law that a fixture as part of
10. See Addenda to this article for recent changes.
11. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
12. Id. at 524-25.
13. Id. at 527.
14. Burns, supra note 7.
[Vol. 14:683
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the real estate acquired all characteristics of real estate. Thus, the fixture
ceased to have an individual life as such. Persons dealing with it were
bound by notice of matters appearing in the chain of title to real estate
in the records of the county. 5 Persons dealing with the real estate in
reliance on the record were protected against matters not in the county
real estate records and of which they had no knowledge. 6 These prin-
ciples are at odds with the new fixture lien. Is the secured party wholly
insulated from the recording laws? Can provisions within instruments
of record be ignored by him? Would the same result apply if he has
actual knowledge of them? Can a covenant in a lease or mortgage limit
the right of a secured party to obtain a right ahead of the claimants of
real estate interests of record? The pre-affixation security interest at
least probably achieves this preferred position by the phraseology which
authorizes it'7 in Ohio Revised Code section 1309.32 (B) (UCC §
9-313 (2) ):
(B) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become
fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who
have an interest in the real estate except as stated in division (D) of
this section.
The super-priority authorized by Revised Code section 1309.32 (B)
is not limited to liens on fixtures (UCC § 9-102(2)) which add value
to the property equal to their cost. It may even apply to a replacement
fixture which supersedes a useable one, or to a fixture attached by a
debtor with no apparent rights of record and even without any actual in-
terest in the title to the real property. It cannot be argued that such a
lien is needed to permit plant expansion, since detachable machinery is
likely to be personalty in Ohio."6
Creation of the Lien
Identification of the person who can create this new lien appears in
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.01 (A) (4) (UCC § 9-105(1) (d))
as follows:
(4) "Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other perform-
ance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in
collateral, and includes the seller of accounts, contract rights, or chattel
paper. Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the
same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in any
provision of sections 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised Code
15. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Sav. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273
(1939).
16. XXth Century Heating v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229
(1937).
17. See addenda to this article for recent changes.
18. Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corp., 144 Ohio St. 529, 60 N.E.2d 170 (1945); Standard
Oil Co. v. Zangerle, 141 Ohio St. 505, 49 N.E.2d 406 (1943).
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dealing with the collateral, the obligator in any provision dealing with
the obligation, and may include both where the context so requires ....
If the fixture is still at least an abridged version of its former self, it
is at least partly identifiable as a segment of the real estate. But the lien
upon it may be created by persons far different than can create any other
form of lien on any other interest or right in the real estate. For this lien
arises from the act of the debtor who had an interest in the collateral and
then remains with the security after its affixation to the real estate. The
owner of the real estate may be the debtor, but other persons as well may
be qualified to create this security interest lien. Included are persons
with rights in the land, such as lessors or even mere tenants, vendees not
in possession whose interests may not be evident from examination of
the records, persons with undisclosed equitable interests, and the like.
The security interest is not limited to persons with rights in the land. It
can also be created by others who would qualify as debtors with an in-
terest in the collateral, but who never have any interest in the real prop-
erty. Thus, the manufacturer, the wholesaler, the dealer, the installer, or
the contractor who affixed the fixture might be able to create this lien.
Super-Priority of the Fixture Lien
The real breadth of the new fixture lien lies in the words which, with
certain exceptions, give it priority over the claims of all persons who have
an interest in the real estate. It is through these words in particular that
the fixture and its lien acquire a new and different meaning even though
the same statute refers to the law of the state for definition. For this
provision to be operative, the goods must maintain a separate, separable
life from the real property to which it is affixed. Thus, Teaff v. Hewitt
is embraced and disembowelled, simultaneously.
One other critical word in section 1309.32(B) (UCC 5 9-313(a)
is "attaches." Since the lien arises and achieves its priority by attach-
ment, the position it acquires in relation to other liens may not be deter-
mined prior to a contest. The definition of "attachment" appears in
Ohio Revised Code section 1309.15 (A) (UCC § 9-204 (1) ):
(A) A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement, as
defined in division (C) of section 1301.01 of the Revised Code, that it
attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. It
attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken
place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
Because none of the three basic requirements for attachment of a
security interest is of record in a public document or filing of any kind,
the time when any of these has taken place remains wholly within the
knowledge of the parties. Since the lien is effective only after all three
requirements have taken place, and since they may happen in any order,
[Vol. 14:683
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priority can be claimed and not disproven until evidence is disclosed by
legal action. The negotiation value of a claim which cannot be disproved
without litigation is inescapable. The secrecy of it alone creates an un-
usual advantage for the secured party.
Section 1309.32(C) (UCC § 9-313(3)) permits a security inter-
est to attach to goods after they become fixtures. Like the preceding
paragraph, it allows the lien to arise by attachment and makes the same
reference to exceptions as appear in division (D). Unlike paragraph
(B), the post affixation lien has no priority over prior acquired liens or
,rights unless such rights are waived in its favor in writing.
Exceptions to Priority
The obvious unfairness of liens which are secret but superior was too
great to leave untrammelled. The restrictions contained in division (D)
are apparently designed to alleviate the greatest of the inequities which
might otherwise arise under divisions (B) and (C). It provides as fol-
lows:
(D) The security interests described in division (B) and (C) of
this section do not take priority over:
(1) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate;
or
(2) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained
by judicial proceedings; or
(3) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate
to the extent that he makes subsequent advances; if the subsequent pur-
chase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or the sub-
sequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted for
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
A purchaser of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encum-
brancer purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser
within this section.19
Perfection and Secrecy
Here for the first time the recording step is brought into the picture,
though the word used is perfect. Perfection gives priority over even the
specified exceptions unless they arise prior to perfection and without
knowledge of the interest. The novelty of the rights of the secured party
as contrasted with those of other lienholders is apparent. Even after fil-
ing, priority of the security interest remains unsettled. Perfection is not
recording alone, but requires the steps for attachment as well. Since the
four steps may occur in any order, filing may be the first, last, or middle
step. And since knowledge of the security interest on the part of another
lien claimant is the equivalent of perfection to him, priority of the new
lien cannot be fixed easily. If a dispute arises, the court must determine
19. OHIo REv. CODE § 1309.32(D) (UCC § 9-313(4)).
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many facts not automatically apparent. Unlike traditional real property
rights in Ohio, most of which are normally effective from filing, the se-
curity interest is almost entirely submerged. To determine the factors
which affect it alone, the date of the agreement that it attaches, the date
value is given, the date the debtor has rights in the collateral, the date of
filing of the lien, and the date on which each other interested party first
knew of the security interest must be considered. In addition, other fac-
tors which place the new lien in its proper status in relation to other
liens must also be considered. The total of all these factors make the
security interest fixture lien completely unsatisfactory to persons raised
in an atmosphere of traditional real property rights, record interests and
liens, and first in time, first in right theories.
Obscurities of Filing
Even when filed, this new fixture lien bears little similarity to other
real property rights. The place of filing is defined in Ohio Revised Code
section 1309.38(A)(2) (UCC § 9-401(1)(c)) as follows:
(2) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest
attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mort-
gage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded ....
Though the office is specified, the place in that office remains obscure.
But this is only one of a multitude of filing problems. The first question
apparent in section 1309.38(A) (2) (UCC § 9-401(1) (c)) is raised
by the words defining the application of this section. If the collateral is
not intended to become a fixture at the time the security interest attaches,
but later is affixed as one, then the filing specified is not the required one.
The goods may have been of such a nature that filing with the Secretary
of State would be sufficient filing for perfection. The lien thus achieved
would remain effective when the goods would later be attached as a fix-
ture2" by virtue of other provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 1309.38
(UCC § 9-401).
In Ohio, real estate mortgages are filed in the County Recorder's of-
fice. Because this office maintains numerous records,2 confusion exists.
Among the problems which must be solved are: Should the instrument
be filed with other security interest financing statements? Should it be
filed in real estate mortgage records, either instead of, or in addition to
the other location? Should it receive a separate recording place of its
own? If placed with all other records of financing statements in the
more busy counties, the excessive burden of inquiries by persons dealing
in real estate could overwhelm this successor to the chattel lien depart-
20. Coogan, supra note 4, at 1330.
21. Burns, supra note 7, at 67.
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ment.22  This is another area where uniformity has not been achieved.
In Pennsylvania, liens on chattels are filed with the prothonotary, and
mortgages on real estate are filed in a different county office. Thus, no
danger of mixing the new fixture lien with the voluminous filings affect-
ing personalty exists as in Ohio.
Lien Circuity
As previously noted, a lien on a fixture is subject to the exceptions to
its priority in section 1309.32(D) (UCC § 9-313(4)) only if the ex-
ceptions arise between attachment and perfection of the security interest.
The exceptions do not exist in a vacuum, however. Each acquires its own
priority and position in relation to other liens, rights in the land, and
affixed appurtenances. Since the position acquired by each of the sped-
fied exceptions is precise, except for the relation to the fixture lien, the
new lien puts the exception in an ambiguous priority position. The re-
sult is lien circuity. Some examples will disclose the dilemma which
courts may face in trying to enforce liens.
Let us suppose that the owner of Blackacre Building, who already has
a mortgage to a bank with a balance due of $100,000, decides to borrow
an additional $20,000 to be secured by a second mortgage on the build-
ing. The mortgage is recorded, and the $20,000 fund will be disbursed
as requested over a period of six months. The owner then orders a new
elevator to replace the one presently in use, and it is installed at a cost of
$25,000, subject to a security interest which is perfected, but only after
disbursement of the second mortgage. The owner suddenly becomes in-
solvent at this point, having made no payments on any of the above
amounts.
This is a relatively uninvolved situation, and its solution should not
be difficult. The elevator is a fixture subject to a security interest which
is ahead of the first mortgage and junior to the second mortgage. The
rest of the real estate is subject to the mortgages only. Could a court
partition the fixture from the building? If so, how? No procedures,
criteria, or standards for such a partition are set forth in the Uniform
Commercial Code. The first mortgagee might benefit if the fixture were
appraised as it would be valued if a used separated component. A re-
moved elevator would have comparatively little value, and the second
mortgage would have first priority as to it. The secured party and the
second mortgagee might prefer to see the elevator appraised at its new
cost less depredation, and separately valued as the proportion of the total
sale price which that value bears to the value of the building without the
elevator. Other alternatives would include appraising the building with
22. See Addenda to this article for recent changes.
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and without the elevator, and appraising the elevator and the building
each independently. Considering the worth of the building and the ele-
vator separately, however, is a contradiction of the fixture concept. 3 The
value of the fixture lies in the combination with the real property and is
inconsistent with separation of it.
Partition of real estate interests is made by express statutory proce-
dure. The Uniform Commercial Code does not provide for a similar di-
vision of fixture and real property values. Yet the problems may be
vastly more complicated when fixtures are treated as independent for
lien purposes in regard to some liens, than where co-owners split up.
It is possible that a court might postpone deciding how to evaluate
the securities subject to a lien until after their sale because it is possible
the price realized might be sufficient to pay all lienholders. If it is in-
adequate to satisfy all liens, then the judge must face the prospect of re-
solving disputes with minimal legal guideposts as to (1) method of ap-
portioning value between fixture security and real property security;
(2) determination of time of attachment and time of perfection of se-
curity interest; and (3) the irreconcilable priority problem of second
mortgagee ahead of secured party, secured party ahead of first mortgagee,
and first mortgagee ahead of second mortgagee.
The situation becomes more complicated as other factors appear. If
a purchaser for value without notice acquires his interest between attach-
ment and perfection of the security interest, the problem is not analogous
to that of an intervening lienholder. The only manner in which an
owner can have a prior interest to a lienholder is if the lien is void as
against him. But if claims are involved which are inferior to the "void"
lien, but superior to the right of the new owner, then the problem which
the court faces is even more difficult than the mortgage problem pre-
viously discussed.
Circuity of lien is in fact the antithesis of priority. Priority is the
orderly, consecutive assignment of position to rights. Circuity of lien pro-
hibits logical priority. While lien circuity is not new to the law, it is
not a desirable condition at any time. Certainly, it is a strange condition
to build into a model act designed to create uniform law. The presence
of lien circuity in the code results from seeking to achieve an unnatural
and illogical position for the fixture lien. Any value this adds to the
fixture lien is not newly found equity, but is a subtraction from the rights
of real property security holders. But it is possible that a court might
recognize that the dilemma of fixture priority and circuity is insoluble,
and that the fixture lien is not sufficiently coherent to be construed and
enforced.
23. 24 OHIO JUR. 2d Fixtures 5 2 (1957).
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Other Problems of Enforcement
Additional confusion arises under the last sentence of section 1309.32
(D) (UCC § 9-313 (4)), which is supposedly designed to preserve still
one more preference for the fixture lien claimant. The full intent and
meaning of this provision, however, is not immediately apparent. This
does not automatically give the purchaser at a foreclosure sale a title
free of fixture liens (provided he is not the foreclosing encumbrancer),
but merely makes him a subsequent purchaser. The subsequent purchaser
is only protected if he acquires his interest prior to perfection and without
knowledge of the security interest. If the lien is perfected before sale,
this provision is inoperative. Presumably the fixture lien is intended to
survive the foreclosure sale even if it is perfected after the action is lis
pendens, and in fact even after decree but before sale. However, this
limited protection to a purchaser is also withheld from the encumbrancer
who purchases at his own foreclosure sale. Why does additional dis-
crimination exist against the real estate encumbrancer? The logic of thus
discouraging the best qualified bidder is hard to understand. It seems
to reflect the antagonistic attitude toward the real estate lien claimant
which permeates the fixture lien provisions.
Presumably this last discussed provision is inapplicable if the secured
party is a defendant in the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, it might be
possible to have priority if the security interest is filed and indexed in
such a manner that the searching of records in the chain of title owner-
ship would disclose it, or if the foreclosing party knows of the fixture
lien. In this circumstance, the fixture lien would be among those mar-
shalled, and it is not reasonable to assume that it would then survive the
sale, regardless of whom the purchaser might be. The few words of the
code which raise the question thus further detract from clarity, simplicity,
and from equitable treatment of the persons affected.
The enforcement of the fixture lien has been considered previously
from the standpoint of actions initiated by the holders of other than the
fixture lien. A new area of law is involved when the enforcement of
the lien is commenced by the secured party. Section 1309.32(E)
(UCC § 9-313 (5)) provides:
(E) When under divisions (B) or (C) and (D) of this section a se-
cured party has priority over the claims of all persons who have inter-
ests in the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of
sections 1309.44 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised Code, remove his
collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer
or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not other-
wise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any
diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods
removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to
reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party
gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
1963]
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The prime requisite for removal of the fixture is that the secured
party have priority over the claims of all persons with an interest in the
real estate. This is more glibly said than proven. Even a pre-affixation
lien may lack a position of priority if other rights accrued between at-
tachment and perfection of the lien. Therefore, it would be wise for the
secured party to examine the real estate records for this period. Whether
this is sufficient may depend in part on how strictly the definition of
"fixture" as real estate under Ohio law is construed. For the existence of
other fixture liens might extinguish the right to proceed under the pro-
visions of this paragraph. These might not be easily determinable be-
cause of the actual provisions designed to prefer fixture liens without the
requirement for their dear disclosure within the chain of record tide.
The requirement to reimburse is quite foggy. In fact, anyone em-
ploying the remedy of fixture removal may be doing so at his own peril.
Since the word "must" seems to put the duty of reimbursement on the se-
cured party, it would seem to follow that he must first determine the
identities of all encumbrancers and owners, not merely those with rights
superior to his own. At this point, nothing short of a full examination
of the title would suffice to supply the information, and even it may fail
to turn up rights evident from possession of the premises, rights of other
fixture lienholders, rights of unrecorded mechanics lien claimants, and
perhaps others. After discovering who the parties are to the best of his
ability, the secured party is then required to reimburse or give adequate
security to any (or each?) of them.24 May one of the real estate lien
holders refuse permission because he has not been reimbursed, even
though another or others have been? This problem was apparently over-
looked in drafting the code. How much simpler it would have been if
the secured party merely had to make the specified repairs!
Once the secured party determines he can remove the fixture, he may
have spent much time in worthless exercise. In virtually every circum-
stance, the removed fixture will have significantly less value as a used
component than as a part of the structure. The threat of removal may
have some effect in pressuring lienholders to pay a debt of their debtors,
but the mortgagee who calls the bluff of the fixture lienholder may in-
duce second thoughts. Removal may deprive the security of much of
its value.
Casual observation of the provisions of Ohio Revised Code section
24. This requirement has been revised by the 105th General Assembly by insertion of a
requirement in Ohio Revised Code section 1309.32(E) that "the secured party shall give
reasonable notification of his intention to remove the collateral to all persons entitled to reim-
bursement." (Emphasis added.) Reasonable notice is not defined as to method, or period
of time. Thus, one court might consider a phone call six hours prior to removal as reasonable,
while another might consider thirty days or longer and written notice as a reasonable minimum.
This new wording may have merely spelled out an implication of the original statute without
eliminating its vagueness.
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1309.44(D) (UCC § 9-501(4)) suggests it may offer the most ob-
vious directions for enforcement of the fixture lien. Division (D) states:
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,
the secured party may proceed under sections 1309.44 to 1309.50, inclu-
sive, of the Revised Code, as to the personal property or he may proceed
as to both the real and the personal property in accordance with his
rights and remedies in respect of the real property in which case the
provisions of sections 1309.44 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised
Code, do not apply.
Whether this section is available to the claimant of a fixture lien
may be determined by judicial interpretation of whether Ohio Revised
Code section 1309.32 changes a fixture from its original definition as
being real property into some more ambiguous state which is both real
property and personal property. If the fixture is still real property, then
the lien charging it alone does not cover real and personal property,
though the security may be treated as real or personal property. Strict
construction of this provision would extinguish any utility it might have
for a fixture lien claimant unless his lien also covered additional pieces
of personal property.
Suppose the preceding provision is applicable to enforcement of fix-
ture liens. If the security interest is to be enforced as a lien on personal
property, it must first qualify under section 1309.32 (E) (UCC § 9-
313 (5) ). If it cannot, then presumably the lien may only be enforced
in accordance with the rights and remedies in respect to the real property.
This would be true even though the lien is only on the fixture as a part
of the structure and not on any other part of the real property. When
the secured party initiates proceedings to foreclose this lien, he encounters
the following problems: proving all the prerequisites of attachment and
perfection to establish his priority; lien circuity; partitioning his interest;
conflict with other fixture liens charged against the real estate; and such
a jungle of legal uncertainty that the value of his enforcement right may
be most difficult to appraise in advance. A foreclosure action involving
complex litigation may be both costly and time consuming.
Third Parties and Lien Secrecy
A person dealing with real estate or liens upon it has been protected
substantially against liens and rights not apparent from examination of
the public records in the chain of title and inspection of the premises for
rights thus made evident. In Ohio, even the latter have been gradually
shrivelling, as witness the requirements by recent legislatures for land
contracts to be recorded, 5 and the fragmentation of the subdivision blan-
25. Omio Ray. CODE §§ 5301.25, 317.08, as amended (1961).
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ket mechanics lien.26 In relation to chattel liens, Peter F. Coogan de-
scribes the demands for notice of lien rights as a "400 year struggle...
[in which] the parties favoring secrecy have, for the most part, been the
losers."27  The new fixture lien provisions are a step backward in Ohio.
The pre-affixation fixture lien is ahead of all prior interests,2" with a
few exceptions, upon its attachment. If it attaches to a chattel not in-
tended to become a fixture, it may remain a fixture lien without any re-
filing as such.29 In the absence of corrective legislation, the filing of a
fixture lien in Ohio neither requires the name of the owner to appear in
the record nor the recorder to index any reference to the owner. In fact,
since the debtor may not have had any interest in the real estate, no title
searcher could possibly know what names to search. (See Addenda.)
It is true that the filing requirements call for a description of the real
estate.3" But even here the atmosphere has been fogged. If nothing
more had been said, the common-law requirement of a description would
compel sufficient definiteness to locate and identify the parcel intended
with certainty so that no other might be confused with it. Ohio Revised
Code section 1309.08 (UCC 5 9-110)1 provides as follows:
For the purposes of sections 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Code, any description of personal property or real estate is suffi-
cient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is de-
scribed.
The critical element in a description of real estate, regardless of
length, is specificity. How can real estate be reasonably identified by a
description which is not specific? Would an unspecific description of
real estate mean anything? Would "my three houses in Blackacre Town-
ship" be sufficient? Would the street name, R.F.D. number, or address
meet the test? Would "third house east of corner of Able and Baker
street" suffice, considering that public records normally show parcels of
real estate, but not structures on them?
If the security interest cannot be located by a mortgagee, prospective
mortgagee, or prospective purchaser through an examination of the rec-
26. OHIo REV. CODE § 1311.08, as amended (1961).
27. Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Other Recent Chattel
Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. REV. 289 (1962).
28. A major priority change was made in this provision by the 105th General Assembly.
The revision of section 1309.32 (B) eliminates priority of the fixture lien over rights of per-
sons with an interest in the real estate at the time the security interest is perfected. See Addenda
for further discussion of latest changes.
29. Coogan, supra note 27, at 327. See Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1319, 1334 (1962).
30. OsHIo REv. CODE § 1309.39(C) (3) (UCC § 9-402(3) (c)).
31. House Bill 247 in the 105th General Assembly was designed to require a legal descrip-
tion sufficient for a deed or conveyance to be used in a fixture lien financing statement. This
bill did not get out of committee.
[Vol. 14:683
Hollander, Ohio Fixture Liens
ords, then the lien is a secret transfer of security. "Let it [the transfer]
be made in a public manner, and before the neighbors, and not in private,
for secrecy is a mark of fraud." 2
CONCLUSION
The new fixture lien provision was apparently designed to favor the
holder with a preferred position. In seeking to achieve this result without
excessively abusing the rights of others who have been deprived of pro-
tected positions, the security interest is given ambiguous characteristics.
It was intended to be more powerful, valuable, versatile, and more easily
enforced. But it may be none of these. The security interest in fixtures
is vague as to its coverage, unclear as to priority, unclear as to enforce-
ment procedure and effect, inequitable as to third parties with traditional
rights in real estate, and lacking in uniformity. Even the courts are ex-
posed to a whole new set of problems without sufficient guidelines, and
in which many new elements require interpretation in each case that
arises. In fact, many of the determinations will not serve as precedents
of any value for future actions because the facts of each situation may
be peculiar to the result. The ease of determining priority from the re-
cording date accorded to most real estate liens is not even available be-
cause filing for record is only an incident of a series in which it may be
the last or an earlier step toward achieving perfection.
Certainly real estate lenders and purchasers cannot be pleased with
the Uniform Commercial Code fixture lien. Is the fixture lien secured
party really benefited by these lien peculiarities? If the fixture lien re-
ceived a priority from filing date over the entire real estate to which the
goods are affixed; if it described the land with sufficient clarity that no
dispute could arise; and if it were filed according to the name of the owner
so that all the world could know and be charged with notice, would it
really be a weaker lien? Certainly the enforcement of it would be infi-
nitely easier and less costly. The courts and the legal profession might
be better served by the added coherence. Even circuity of lien would be
replaced with orderly sequence.
Should correction of the known defects in fixture liens await expe-
rience in more states? The logic of such a position is at best elusive.
Why saddle increasing numbers of states with flaws which are already
clearly apparent? Why await losses to innocent parties and endure with-
ering of property and security rights by uncertainty? The fixture lien
concept under the Uniform Commercial Code requires major surgery. It
32. Twynes's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 81a, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 914 (K.B. 1601). Nearly five
centuries after Lord Coke made his forceful attack against secret rights, the struggle for dis-
closure continues. The Uniform Commercial Code is a new battleground in this conflict.
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requires correction of an attitude of preference for the lien of the secured
party, clarity, simplicity, and an equitable relationship with holders of
interests in or liens on real property.
ADDENDA
Since preparation of this article, the 105th General Assembly of Ohio
has made significant revisions in the Ohio fixture lien law. Ohio Revised
Code section 1309.32 (UCC § 9-313) was modified dramatically to
extinguish the preferential position it had given the fixture lien. The
modification states:
[The lien is] invalid against any person with an interest in the real
estate at the time the security interest is perfected or at the time the
goods are affixed to the real estate, whichever occurs later, who has not
in writing consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest
in the goods as fixtures ....
By commencing fixture lien priority in relation to real property in-
terests with time of perfection, the real estate lien has been restored to
its pre-code position, and the doctrine of the Holland Furnace case"3 has
been re-established.
Section 1309.32(E) (UCC § 9-313(5)) was modified by express-
ly requiring the fixture lien claimant to give "reasonable notification of
his intention to remove the collateral to all persons entitled to reimburse-
ment."34  Since "reasonable" is not defined, the courts must determine
its meaning in each case. Certainly greater clarity could have been
achieved by specifying a standard for notice, such as notice in writing at
least ten days prior to removal.
New requirements for disclosure of the name of the record owner
or record lessee on a fixture lien financing statement and for indexing
the document by that name have been added to Ohio Revised Code sec-
tions 1309.39 and 1309.40 (UCC §§ 9-401, 402). The secrecy in-
herent in the fixture lien under the uniform law as enacted in Ohio has
thus been terminated. The fixture lien filing has also been transferred
from the financing statement records to the real estate mortgage record,
so the recorder will not have to be bothered by those interested in seeking
information on only real property liens.
The Uniform Commercial Code failed to achieve fixture lien uni-
formity. The new Ohio variations remove any pretense of this. The
33. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273
(1939).
34. See note 28 supra.
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inequities originally imposed on third parties with interests in real prop-
erty by the Uniform Commercial Code have been largely alleviated, but
the fixture lien claimant may still be in an uncertain legal position.
Where the debtor has an interest in the real estate title his best security
might be a real estate mortgage in lieu of the fixture lien, so that his
lien enforcement would avoid the uncertainties of partitioning fixture
from real estate value and of meeting complex requirements for detach-
ment of his security.
